Aśxa, spring 2013
Aĭasĭari founds new party
(June 10) - A group of politicians and activists under the informal leadership of the former WHP representative and popular blogger Saraq Aĭasĭari (道 佳虹), and including many of the party leaders of the Pirate Party, former members of the WHP, and influential members of the Khusqaian Internet and Computer Industry Association (KICIA), have founded a new political party focusing on internet freedom, civil liberties, tax reduction and simplification, decrease of economic regulation, and generous support for the arts and applied sciences. The new party has a temporary name "New Freedom Party", but has not decided yet what its real name is going to be. According to opinion polls, the party will win some seats in next election (in April 2014) and has until early February to decide on its name (and other necessary formalities).
MPP members force party to change course
(May 13) - Yesterday's party congress was without doubt the most revolutionary in the history of the Middle Path Party (MPP). A majority of representatives voted against the party leadership's advice, and then continued by voting for a motion calling for those party leaders to step down.
The upheaval started with a report by a number of Upper House members about the gradual decline of the party in recent years. The main cause of the decline according to this report is that the MPP became a party of public administrators and managers rather than a party of the people. The report advises the party to become a people's party again, and to make its ideological identification more explicit. That ideological identification is Khusqaian Buddhism and communitarianism. After the loss in last election, many party members and politicians sided openly with the writers of the report and one of the main issues in yesterday's party congress was whether to follow the report's advice or not. The party leadership advised against this, fearing that it making the party's identity more explicit would make its appeal more narrow rather than broader, leading to a further decline. However, during the party congress, a number of speakers, including members of both Houses and various district councils, said that they do not belief that the move will lead to further decline, and even if it does, that they'd rather be members and/or representatives of a smaller, but principled party with views they could identify with and belief in, than of a large and faceless party of bureaucrats.
Just over 70% of the representatives voted in favor of the proposal for ideological reorientation (or "reconfirmation", as it was called by some), after which the party leadership responded that they will "study the issue" and tried to move to the next item on the agenda. This, however, lead to an angry response by some representatives and the aforementioned motion against the party leadership. This motion was accepted with a very narrow margin after which party chairman Teneŋ Mixemera laid down his function, and the party congress ended in turmoil.
update (May 14) - Teneŋ Mixemera also resigned as Lower House member. (And thus as Lower House faction chairperson.)
update (June 20) - An extra party congress to appoint a new chairman and some other board members, and to decide on the items of the agenda that were not settled in last congress will be held on June 2.
update (June 3) - Upper House member Aŋka Mecemegi (网 珍恩) has been appointed the new chairman of the MPP. Mecemegi was one of the writers of the aforementioned report.
election loss moves parties to change
(April 24) - The three parties that lost most in last district election - MPP, WHP, and Alliance party - are moving in the direction of change, either willingly or unwillingly. MPP and Alliance Party have party congresses soon and will probably change aspects of their political course and style after that. The WHP is facing more serious problems, however.
The continuing efforts of the police in the battle against organized crime (supported by a series of documentaries on national TV deteriorating public support for Sĭoŋsĭö, the main crime syndicate) have severely compromised the WHP, and reduced its support base to about a quarter of what it was before. Probably forced by these developments, the Khusqaian Internet and Computer Industry Association (KICIA) has withdrawn its support for the WHP and started talks with the still tiny Pirate Party of Khusqaikama. Some other large companies and associations formerly associated with Sĭoŋsĭö (mainly in the porn and entertainment industry) have also withdrawn their support for the WHP. This loss of corporate support also implies a loss of the party's main sources of income, and most commentators expect that the party will not survive this.
Only two weeks after the election, Saraq Aĭasĭari (道 佳虹), one of the two WHP members elected in Ammuusĭaamakĭuŋ also left the party and consequently gave up her seat in the district council. Aĭasĭari, who also represented WHP in the previous four years, wrote on her popular blog that "due to circumstances" the WHP will no longer be able to do what it was supposed to do (in her opinion), and called for other former WHP members and supporters, organizations (with explicit mention of the Pirate Party and KICIA), and individuals to unite under the banner of a program focusing on internet freedom, civil liberties, tax reduction and simplification, decrease of economic regulation, and generous support for the arts and applied sciences.
The Alliance Party, which has been plagued by internal struggles and conflicts, is facing two major problems. The first and most obvious is to overcome the conflicts and rebuild the organization. The second, and perhaps more serious problem, is the gradual 'derussification'. The Alliance Party is the party of the Russian minority in Khusqaikama, but partially because Khusqaikama is doing better economically than neighboring parts of Russia (and many other parts of Russia as well), and partially because of the negative image of Russia caused by Russian tourists and occasional news about the country, Russia has lost much of its luster. Moreover, already two decades have passed since Khusqaikama broke its formal ties with Russia, and most children of Russians in Khusqaikama consider themselves Khusqaian rather than Russian. Prominent party members have suggested to change the party to focus more on the interests of Russians in Khusqaikama than on international policy (i.e. forming an alliance with Russia), but even this might not save the party. The party has already been arguing for bilingual signs in Ammuusĭaama, for example, but among citizens of Russian decent and their children there are few who (still) find this necessary, and in a recent survey, a majority even stated that they prefer children to learn more English and less (or even no) Russian in school.
A number of Upper House members of the MPP wrote a report about the gradual decline of the party, which was published earlier this week. The main cause of the decline according to this report is that the MPP became a party of public administrators and managers rather than a party of the people. The report advises the party to become a people's party again, and to make its ideological identification more explicit. That ideological identification is Khusqaian Buddhism and communitarianism. Even if this policy will not make the party larger immediately, it will strengthen its roots in Khusqaian society. A few prominent members of the party have responded to the report in the last few days, mostly positively.
Maŋkamuu "pleasantly surprised" by Huenanese critique of Dhram Phá
(April 19) - In a letter to Aśxa, minister Kampo Maŋkamuu (of infrastructure, housing, and environment) writes that he is "pleasantly surprised" by the critical remarks about the Dhramphanese regime made by the Huenanese minister of foreign affairs, E Rǝn-fu, in an interview. Maŋkamuu was minister of foreign affairs in the previous cabinet and his lack of diplomatic subtlety in that period simultaneously (further) damaged Khusqaian foreign relations (with some countries) and made him popular within Khusqaikama. After the failed FICT summit in Dhram Phá last year, in which he tried to address the political situation in that country, he said that he was disappointed about the lack of criticism of the Dhramphanese regime: "While the police was outside shooting at protestors, the delegations were just arguing with each other, but no one said a word about the situation in Dhram Phá" (source). Ever since, he has been an outspoken critic about Dhram Phá and its membership of the Exumbran Convention. Maŋkamuu writes in his letter that the country should never have been allowed to join that organization on the basis of vague promises (if promises actually were made, which is far from certain as there are no documents proving this), and should be "kicked out" of the Convention as soon as possible. Of course, Maŋkamuu has little to say about foreign policy, and has a history of making undiplomatic remarks (he suggested to break diplomatic relations with Russia last year, for example), but it may very well be the case that the worry about the situation in Dhram Phá is more widespread. Recently, less news comes out of Dhram Phá than out of North-Korea, while Dhram Phá is supposed to be on a path of economic (and possibly political) reform.
Lower house accepts copyright law
(April 15) - After more than 10 years of discussion, research reports, and negotiations, this morning the lower house finally approved of a copyright law. The new law will make it illegal to copy and republish copyrighted materials for commercial purposes, and is intended to better protect several related rights such as trademarks and authorship. Nevertheless, the law does not slavishly follow the international standards that especially the US and the EU have been trying to enforce upon Khusqaikama by means of economic sanctions. The law does not say anything about copying for private use, or about file sharing, and it is unlikely that the lower house will adopt laws of policies to restrict either in the near future. Hence, whether the new law is sufficient for relaxation of the sanctions remains to be seen.
MPP continues to lose ground in district council elections
(April 8) - Yesterday's district council (kĭuŋ-xŭei) elections where the third elections in a row in which the MPP lost seats. Once the dominant party in Khusqaian politics, the MPP is now increasingly unable to attract voters, and is becoming one of the many middle-sized parties in the fragmented political landscape of Khusqaikama. Largest winners are PPP and Särkaĭ. (See the table below.)
The DSP won in Ammuusĭaamakĭuŋ, which seems mostly due to the loss of the Alliance Party (see below), but lost in many other districts. Nevertheless, it is now by far the largest party. For the first time since the democratization of 1991, the descendant of the former ruling communist party is again the leading force in Khusqaian politics. But, of course, this is by no means the same party, ideologically nor organizationally. The ideological heir of the old communist party, the CPKR, however, has been doing well in this election too, gaining seats in three districts, and losing nowhere. Despite this, the CPKR remains a fairly small party, although its influence in the larger cities is growing. Särkaĭ, the third party on the left of the spectrum, gained many more votes in the cities as well, but while the CPKR increasingly also wins votes in rural areas, Särkaĭ is losing votes in those parts of the country. The urban gains very much outweigh the rural losses, however, resulting in 9 new seats for the party. Most spectacular was its growth from one to four seats in Ammuusĭaamakĭuŋ, where the party recently gained strong support among students and the city's flourishing artist community.
The MPP, as mentioned, is the biggest loser of this election, losing 11 seats in total, and winning nowhere. Many of these voters seems to have moved to the other centrist party PPP, which always was a very small party, but which has grown spectacularly in the last two years, probably largely in response to the increasing polarization in Khusqaian politics. The conservative Prosperity Party, which is often also considered to be centrist, did win as well, especially in Cekentyryŋ.
On the right, both NLP (liberal) and KPP (nationalist) remained more or less at the same size. Both won in some districts and lost in others, nearly balancing gains and losses. Nevertheless, the NLP grew a little and is now almost as large as the MPP.
The regional parties did very well in parts of the country where they were already strong, especially Ammaƥuxasakĭuŋ and Akaŋqammaŋkamakĭuŋ, but also gained seats in other districts. The minor parties Alliance Party and WHP experienced their biggest losses. Both are now only represented in Ammuusĭaamakĭuŋ, their traditional power base, but even there both lost more than half their seats. In case of the Alliance Party, the party of the Russian minority, this seems largely due to internal conflicts in this party. Because of this, many voters switched to DSP or CPKR. The organized crime related WHP probably lost much support thanks to a number of documentaries about organized crime in Ammuusĭaama broadcasted by the national TV in the campaign season.
| party | 2009 | 2013 | won | lost | kept | ||
| sum | # | sum | # | ||||
| DSP | 53 | 11 | 51 | 11 | 3 | 6 | 2 |
| CPKR | 13 | 10 | 16 | 10 | 3 | 0 | 7 |
| Alliance P. | 8 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| KPP | 14 | 9 | 14 | 8 | 3 | 3 | 4 |
| MPP | 56 | 11 | 45 | 11 | 0 | 7 | 4 |
| PPP | 15 | 10 | 23 | 11 | 6 | 1 | 4 |
| NLP | 37 | 11 | 39 | 11 | 4 | 1 | 6 |
| Särkaĭ | 16 | 9 | 25 | 10 | 6 | 1 | 3 |
| Prosperity P. | 9 | 6 | 13 | 7 | 4 | 1 | 3 |
| WHP | 7 | 3 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 3 | 0 |
| regional parties | 15 | 6 | 19 | 7 | 4 | 0 | 3 |
"sum" = total number of district council seats; "#" = number of district councils in which that party is represented; "won" = number of district councils in which that party gained seats; "lost" = ... lost seats; "kept = ... kept the same number of seats (excluding district councils in which that party is not represented).
Despite the various shifts in power distribution between parties, most of these shifts seem to be very minor, and it is not expected that this will lead to major changes in local governments. Probably, in most districts the same parties that have done so before will form coalitions again, and the same parties will provide mayors. Usually these negotiations do not take long, and it is, therefore, expected that before the end of the week all new mayors and local coalitions are known.
Comparisons with other elections are notoriously difficult because of differences in issues, but may nevertheless be useful to assess electoral trends. Adding up all the votes in all the districts, and comparing the results to the lower house (qaxŭei) elections of two years ago shows some surprisingly large changes. They are surprising mainly because in the last two decades changes in electoral preferences tended to be relatively gradual and small. However, if these had been lower house elections, and the votes would have been the same, then the MPP would have lost 10 of its 18 seats. NLP would win 3 seats; PPP, KPP, and Ammaƥuxasataŋ would win 2; and the rest would win or lose 1 or remain equal. DSP, keeping its current 11 seats, would be the only party with more than 10 seats, illustrating the fragmentation and polarization of Khusqaian politics. However, it is still two years until the next lower house elections, and given recent changes, a lot can change in those two years.
update (April 10) - Seven out of eleven districts have announced their new government coalitions. All of these involved relatively minor changes. In the remaining four districts, the election results suggest or even necessitate more drastic changes in ruling coalitions, and consequently, more negotiations are necessary. In Ammaƥuxasakĭuŋ there was no change. In Niśkitanaĭkĭyŋ and Cattaƥuxasakĭuŋ the coalitions remained the same, but the mayoral position went to a different party (that held it before): from MPP to DSP in the former case, and from MPP to NLP in the latter. In Sĭemƥeikĭyŋ, PPP was added. In Ŋiśriŋicyykĭyŋ, the smallest (and third) coalition partner changed from PPP to the regional party. Ammuusĭaamakĭuŋ continues its coalition without the MPP. Akaŋqammaŋkamakĭuŋ returned to its previous coalition by replacing DSP with MPP. Inaŋkĭyŋ and the three districts of Cekentyryŋ have not announced new coalitions yet.
update (April 11) - Kĭeŋkĭyŋ returned - not unexpectedly - to its previous coalition of DSP, MPP, and Särkaĭ. Ŋiśricekentyryŋkĭyŋ will probably have a coalition of the same three parties plus PPP, but there has been no agreement yet on which party should provide the mayor, and there are a few other minor disagreements as well. Another option would be to continue the current coalition (perhaps with a fourth party for a more stable majority). On the national level Särkaĭ and the Prosperity party have become mortal enemies it seems, but in Ŋiśricekentyryŋkĭyŋ these two parties have been in a coalition (with DSP) for four years without any serious problems. Nevertheless, official statements suggest that a DSP/MPP/Särkaĭ/PPP coalition is the more likely option. In Sikaścekentyryŋkĭyŋ MPP, Prosperity Party, and the regional party Cekentyryntaŋ are largely in agreement, but have only 10 seats (of 23) together, and are therefore searching for another party to reach a majority in the council. However, Särkaĭ and NLP fundamentally disagree with these parties on a number of points, and PPP and DSP have refused, leaving the nationalist KPP as the only option, but MPP does not want to be in a coalition with KPP. In Inaŋkĭyŋ, finally, the DSP/NLP coalition is not likely to continue as it was plagued by incidents and disagreements, but the election results make it very difficult to find a majority coalition that does not include both these parties.
update (April 15) - After a weekend of intense negotiations the three remaining districts announced their new coalitions early this morning. In Ŋiśricekentyryŋkĭyŋ the expected DSP/MPP/Särkaĭ/PPP coalition failed to reach agreement on which party should provide the mayor and on various minor issues. Usually it is the case that the mayor is a member of the largest coalition party, but MPP did not want a Särkaĭ mayor. As mentioned, in Ŋiśricekentyryŋkĭyŋ Särkaĭ and the Prosperity Party have considerably better relations than on the national level, and the two have been in a relatively successful coalition with DSP for four years. Supposedly, it was the DSP which was looking - unsuccessfully, as it turns out - for another coalition, but after those negotiations failed, Särkaĭ and the Prosperity Party quickly reached agreement on continuing the former coalition and convinced the DSP to stay on board as well. Nevertheless, there are obvious ideological differences between Särkaĭ and Prosperity, and with a Särkaĭ mayor, Prosperity was afraid that the new coalition would be too liberal. To compensate that, it requested CPKR to join the coalition (of course, CPKR is also ideologically very different from Prosperity, but its added weight leads to a balance that in some key issues is closer to Propserity's agenda than the coalition without CPKR would be).
Despite vast ideological differences, in Sikaścekentyryŋkĭyŋ MPP, Prosperity Party, and the regional party Cekentyryntaŋ managed to get NLP to join the coalition. The NLP, however, would only consider joining if the PPP would also be a coalition partner, citing two reasons for this request: firstly, the PPP would be able to mediate between NLP and Prosperity (the two parties furthest apart), and secondly, with four parties the majority in the Council would be too small, especially considering the differences within the coalition. In Inaŋkĭyŋ, finally, the three largest parties, DSP, NLP, and MPP, in the end decided to form a 'pragmatic' coalition with a minimal program, that according to critics is going to be an easy target for the left-wing parties CPKR and Särkaĭ, wich thanked much to their recent election success to their opposition to the previous DSP/NLP coalition.